The new head of the EU Commission is being challenged over whether to continue with the post of EU Chief Scientific Adviser (CSA) originally created by outgoing President Barroso. Controversy has emerged over whether the post helps or hinders the EU incorporating the best science into policy.
An initial letter setting out some of the issues and calling for the post to be abolished was signed by 9 non-governmental organisations. There was a strong reaction from other groups and scientists who equated the call for the abolition of the CSA post as being an attack on the 'integrity and independence of scientific advice'. This is a bit odd. By analogy, one would not automatically assume pointing out a medical doctor wasn't doing a good job as being an 'attack on integrity of healthcare'. Now, the original group calling for the post to be abolished has tripled in size as more NGOs from the environment, health and governance sectors have joined in with a second letter explaining further why the CSA post is an impediment to good science in policy making.
The core issue is about the integrity of science advice and process. Science in policy cannot rely on the opinions of a limited number of individuals - whatever their eminence - but needs good processes which gather and test evidence, including, crucially, what can be understood about the extent of uncertainty and ignorance, and clarity and justification for where contested values and judgements shape scientific advice. Advice also needs to be transparent and as far as possible, independent from key economic interests.
Of course, EU science advice does not necessarily live up to this ideal. The EU has a vast amount of science advice and evidence gathering capability. The Joint Research Centre and European Environment Agency produce masses of evidence and reports, at the request of the Commission or independently. Existing Commission Directorates have numerous advisory committees. But the quality of science advice and input can be variable. For example, the PRIMES model used for assessing the impact of climate and energy policy has been heavily criticised by civil society groups and business groups as well as commission advisers for its lack of transparency and questionable methodology. And sometimes the gap between broad reviews of science, and the resulting policy it delivers is large. Think bioenergy, for example, where the gap between what science tells us about of carbon management and actual policy on use of wood as fuel is large. But the problem here is the ability of decision makers to incorporate principles and insights into evidence gathering and policy-making.
The CSA post is neither designed nor equipped to address these weaknesses. Instead, it adds one more scientific advisory post, functioning in a flawed way. Flawed, because some of the activity of the CSA so far appears to have run directly contrary to science advice principles like transparency and clarity of responsibilities. Her advice to President Barroso is not public and she has recently commented that, far from the robust levels of accountability and justification appropriate to good science advice, her advisory opinions should remain ' not transparent' and 'immune from public scrutiny.' The CSA also intervened over the strategy for endocrine-disrupting chemicals, confusing the responsibilities between DG Environment and her own office. The intervention resulted from direct lobbying from small group of scientists with what was subsequently found to be of a flawed interpretation of research. In other words, an intervention which disrupted existing processes and responsibilities on the basis of mistaken science.
Having the opinion of a CSA substitute for wide appraisals of individual directorates and committees leads to a situation where lobbying key individuals like the CSA can have a huge impact, to the detriment of the wider public interest. It's a point not lost on Business Europe, who have lobbied for the retention of the CSA post, but whose record on environmental matters is so poor that progressive companies like Unilever are choosing to terminate their membership.
The lobbying issue is a serious one. The political ecology of Brussels includes a heavy presence of corporate lobbyists - said to be second only to Washington. Society needs broad based, open evidence gathering to act as a bulwark against a policy stitch up in favour of vested interests. A real worry for civil society signatories to the letter about the CSA is that in simple lobbying muscle, corporate lobbyists are always going to win out against those acting for the public interest. Those rigorous science processes are needed as a defence.
Those calling for retention of the post are doing so because they like the idea of science playing a leading role in policy formation. So do we. But why assume that having more science advisers when there already plenty will make the system work any better? The key issue is how it should be done. Disagreeing with one model of science policy advice isn't 'anti-science'. The only member state with a full time CSA is the UK, and for the EU that model hinders rather than helps.
Entities 0 Name: CSA Count: 10 1 Name: EU Count: 5 2 Name: Brussels Count: 2 3 Name: Barroso Count: 2 4 Name: Europe Count: 1 5 Name: Existing Commission Directorates Count: 1 6 Name: Commission Count: 1 7 Name: DG Environment Count: 1 8 Name: EU Commission Count: 1 9 Name: Washington Count: 1 10 Name: Unilever Count: 1 11 Name: Joint Research Centre and European Environment Agency Count: 1 12 Name: UK Count: 1 13 Name: European Council Count: 1 Related 0 Url: http://ift.tt/1nHIUjO Title: Valuing the public in science advice Description: There is now a growing consensus about the importance of science advice in government. Although there are occasional departures from this position, such as the current situation in Canada, the idea that science is important for both diagnosing and dealing with public policy issues is widely acknowledged.
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